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In a model of overlapping generations with a continuum of ﬁnitely-lived indi-
v i d u a l s ,t h ea g g r e g a t ep r i c ed y n a m i c si sc h a r a c t e r i z e db yaf u n c t i o n a ld i ﬀer-
ential equation of mixed-type. Delays and advances are exogenous when the
retirement age is mandatory while they become state-dependent when indi-
viduals are allowed to choose their age at retirement. Using Hopf bifurcation
theorem, periodic solutions in the neighborhood of the monetary steady-state
appearing with a mandatory retirement age, vanish with a chosen age.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C62, D91, E3, J26.
Keywords: Overlapping generations Models, Retirement, Endogenous Fluc-
tuations, Diﬀerential Equations with State-dependent Delays and Advances,
Hopf Bifurcation.1 Introduction
In this article, the relationship between retirement age and macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations is analyzed. Our purpose is to show that allowing individuals
to choose their retirement age reduces the aggregate prices volatility. The
demonstration hinges on two main assumptions. First, the economy pro-
duces a single non storable good. Second, the demographic structure is in
overlapping generations (OLG) with a continuum of ﬁnitely-lived individuals.
We study a simple economy with no capital, which produces a non stor-
able good using a linear technology with respect to aggregate labor. We also
restrict to monetary equilibria, for which the real value of the aggregate as-
set holdings remains positive forever. Under the mandatory retirement age
scheme, the framework reduces to an exchange economy. Prices ﬂuctuations
have then only nominal and distributional eﬀects. They modify the real con-
sumption at the individual level but not at the aggregate one. Alternatively,
w h e ni n d i v i d u a l sc h o o s et h e i rr e t i r e m e n ta g e ,t h ee c o n o m yi so ft h e‘ y e o m a n
farmer’ type. Prices ﬂuctuations then inﬂuence the real aggregate output,
and consequently the aggregate consumption.
Our second assumption is about the age structure of the population. We
consider an OLG model that is well-known to be able to generate cycling
dynamics. These dynamics are appealing to economists because they can
be seen as business cycles and are potentially linked to sunspot equilibria
as described in Cass and Shell (1983). However, the initial proofs of the
existence of such cycles, which were proposed by Gale (1973), Benhabib
and Day (1982) and Grandmont (1985), used an OLG model composed, at
1each point of time, of only two generations. Reichlin (1986), Jullien (1988)
and Benhabib and Laroque (1988), who extended the proofs to production
economies, made the same assumption. This is worrying because the cycles
these models may generate have periods greater than or equal to the indi-
viduals’ life-span. Moreover, it has been conjectured by Sims (1986), that
increasing the frequency of trade among generations, would allow the individ-
uals to smooth the strong revenue eﬀects which are necessary for the existence
of cycles. Hence, the initial existence theorem has recently been extended to
OLG models with either many generations (Aiyagari, 1989; Reichlin, 1992;
Swanson, 1998; Simonovits, 1999; Bhattacharya and Russell, 2003; d’Albis
and Augeraud-Véron, 2007) or, using the equivalence argument developed by
Balasko et al. (1980), with many commodities (Kehoe and Levine, 1984; Ke-
hoe et al. 1991; Ghiglino and Tvede, 1995). Among these studies, Ghiglino
and Tvede (2004) notably propose a proof of existence for a general model
with many generations and many commodities. However, all these extensions
do not include labor supply decisions as it is crucially the case in Grandmont
(1985). Hence, by introducing a retirement age choice, our purpose is to test
the robustness of these recent results.
We use a continuous-time OLG model initially developed by Cass and
Yaari (1967), modiﬁed to allow for individual retirement decisions as in
Boucekkine et al. (2002) and (2004). The inter-temporal equilibrium is
shown to be the solution of a non-linear functional diﬀerential equation of
mixed-type (MFDE). The dynamics is indeed aﬀected by discrete delays
and advances. Delays are generated by the vintage structure of the popula-
tion while advances rely on the expectations of the individuals. Moreover,
2when retirement is endogenous, some of the delays and advances are state-
dependent. We successively characterize the monetary steady-state of our
economy and study the existence of cycles in the neighborhood of the steady-
state. To prove their existence, we follow Rustichini (1989) by looking for
solutions of the linearized MFDE that may have Hopf bifurcation values. We
ﬁnd there exist sets of parameters for which a cycle exists when retirement
is exogenous while there is no cycle when retirement is endogenous. This
means that the strong revenue eﬀects which still may yield cycles when the
frequency of trade is high, are less operative when individuals choose their
retirement age.
The sketch of the article is as follows. In section 2, we present an OLG
model with continuous trading and characterize, in section 3, the inter-
temporal equilibrium of the economy. In section 4, we study the linearized
dynamics in the neighborhood of the monetary steady state and conclude in
section 5.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section, the basic framework of the model is presented. We succes-
sively describe the individual choices and the aggregation procedure. Time
is assumed to be continuous and to have a ﬁnite starting point; let t ≥ 0
denote the time index.
2.1 The individual behavior
Individuals live for an interval of time of length ω>1. They derive util-
ity from consumption and from the length of their retirement. Moreover,
3isoelastic preferences and no time discount are assumed. The inter-temporal

















where c(s,t) ≥ 0 denotes the real consumption of an individual who born at
time s as of time t and z (s) ∈ [0,ω] the age of retirement. Moreover, σ>0
stands for the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, η>0 and α ∈ {0,1}.
Observe that α =0corresponds to the exogenous retirement case, for which
the retirement age is mandatory and normalized to 1. Alternatively, when
α =1 , the retirement age is endogenous.
During a lifetime, a wage is received provided that the individual is work-
i n g ;t h er e a lw a g ei sd e n o t e de(s,t) and satisﬁes:
e(s,t)=
½
1 if t ∈ [s,s +( z (s))
α],
0 otherwise. (2)
Individuals have access to a competitive asset market that yields r(t),t h e
interest rate, which also represents the deﬂation rate. Let a(s,t) denotes the
real wealth of an individual who born at time s as of time t.T h ei n s t a n t a -
neous budget constraint is:
∂a(s,t)
∂t
= r(t)a(s,t)+e(s,t) − c(s,t). (3)
Individuals are born with no ﬁnancial assets and cannot die indebted. Initial
and terminal conditions thus write a(s,s)=0and a(s,s + ω) ≥ 0.I t i s




,t h a tr(t) is continuous




. Finally, it will be convenient








4The individual program is to maximize Eq. (1) subject to Eq. (3), and
the initial and terminal conditions. The separability of the objective allows
to solve the program in two steps. First, a family of optimal consumption
proﬁles parametrized by (z (s))
α is derived. Then, the optimal retirement
age is computed.









Proof: It is standard and available upon request. ¤
Lemma 2 There exists an optimal age of retirement that belongs to (0,ω)
and satisﬁes:









− α(ω − (z (s))
α)
− 1
η =0 . (5)
T h eo p t i m a la g eo fr e t i r e m e n ti su n i q u ei f :











(ω − (z (s))
α)
−1 < 0. (6)
Proof: Replacing Eq. (4) in Eq. (1) yields ˆ u(z (s)). Observe ﬁrst that
z (s)=0is not a solution because limz(s)→0 ˆ u(z (s)) = −∞ if σ ∈ (0,1] and
limz(s)→0 ˆ u0 (z (s)) = +∞ if σ>1.M o r e o v e r ,z (s)=ω is not a solution be-
cause limz(s)→ω ˆ u(z (s)) = −∞ if η ∈ (0,1] and limz(s)→ω ˆ u0 (z (s)) = −∞
if η>1. Hence, there exists z (s) ∈ (0,ω) which is a solution to the
problem. This optimal solution satisﬁes dˆ u(z (s))/dz (s)=0or equiva-
l e n t l y E q .( 5 ) .T h e n , a s u ﬃcient condition for a global maximum, is that
5d2ˆ u(z (s))/d(z (s))
2 < 0 at the optimal point. This condition is given by
Eq. (6). ¤
The optimal age of retirement is given by a standard consumption-leisure
arbitrage. Eq. (4) shows that a longer retirement period implies a lower level
of consumption at each age and Eq. (5) says that the optimum is obtained
when the marginal utility yield by a supplementary unit of leisure equals the
marginal desutility yield by the decrease in consumption. The optimal age
is necessarily an interior solution of the individual program but one should
not exclude multiple local maximum. If the condition given in Eq. (6) is not
satisﬁed, meaning that r(t) is negative, it may indeed exist multiple solutions
to Eq. (5). Nevertheless, it will be shown in section 4 that the optimal age
of retirement is unique in the neighborhood of the monetary steady-state.
2.2 Aggregation
The demographic structure is in OLG. Each cohort, whose size is normalized
to 1, is composed of identical individuals. There is no population growth
and, at each point of time, a new cohort enters the economy while the oldest
one leaves it. The size of the population is consequently equal to ω.
Assume there exists a single non storable good which is produced using
a linear technology with respect to aggregate labour. Total output hence




e(t − s)ds, (7)
where e(t − s) is deﬁned in Eq. (2). The aggregate real consumption, de-
noted C (t), is obtained by integrating over the birth date individual con-











Similarly, the aggregate real wealth is denoted A(t). Money is available in
this economy: it is a non perishable and non consumable bond that may
constitute the counterpart of individual assets. It is assumed that a given
quantity of money was distributed at time t =0and that there were no
further emission since then.
3 The monetary equilibrium
In this section, the price dynamics around the monetary steady-state is char-
acterized. We prove its existence and provide some comparative statics. An
inter-temporal equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 An inter-temporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a
function F (t)=( C (t),A(t),R(t),P(t),z(t)), F : R+ → R4
+ × [0,ω],
F (t) ∈ (C1 (R+))
3×(L2 (R+))
2 such that (i) individuals maximize their util-
ity subject to the budget constraints, (ii) the aggregate consumption equals
the output: C (t)=P (t), and (iii) the aggregate wealth is non negative:
A(t) ≥ 0.
The existence of money allows for a positive aggregate wealth at the
equilibrium. Consider now the following particular equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 2 A monetary steady-state is an inter-temporal equilibrium with
perfect foresight such that the aggregate wealth is a positive constant: A>0.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique monetary steady-state which is character-
ized by the quintuple (C,A,P,R,z) that satisﬁes: R =1 , A =( ω − zα)zα/2,











Proof: At the equilibrium, the aggregate consumption equals the output, the
aggregate wealth writes dA(t)/dt = r(t)A(t).T h i si m p l i e st h a tr =0 ,o r
equivalently, R =1 , is necessary to obtain a constant and positive aggregate
wealth. For r =0 , the condition in Eq. (6) is satisﬁed and, consequently,
there exists a unique age of retirement that is constant. The end of the
computation is immediate. ¤
It is well-known since Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973), that the interest
rate equals the demographic growth rate at the monetary steady-state. By
having supposed a stationary population, we obtain constant steady-state
prices and constant individual consumptions over the life-cycle. Interestingly,
Lemma 3 states that money is always valuated. This is a direct consequence
of the introduction of retirement: in OLG economies, the money has indeed
a value if and only if the average age of the consumer is strictly greater than
the average age of the worker. Then, workers ﬁnance the retired and the
aggregate wealth is positive. Given our simple demographic structure, these
ages are easy to compute and are worth ω/2 and zα/2 respectively. With the
statement of Lemma 2 such that zα ∈ (0,ω), we conclude that the monetary
steady-state exists. In real terms, the value of money is equal to the product
of the output and the diﬀerence between the average ages of consumption
and production. At the limit such that zα → ω, the money has no value and
the economy is autarkic.
Remark, moreover, the ambiguous eﬀect of retirement age on aggregate
8wealth. Postponing retirement has a positive eﬀect on wealth if and only if
zα <ω / 2.I n c r e a s i n gz increases, on the one hand, the aggregate output and
the individual savings while it increases, on the other hand, the average age of
the worker which reduces the incentive to save. Another intuition is obtained
by computing the age at which each individual begins to dissave. Simple
algebra would lead to show that this age is always equal to the retirement
age. Hence, an increase of the retirement age increases the aggregate wealth
if the age at which the dissaving begins belongs to the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h el i f e .
When the retirement age is exogenous, the monetary steady-state is sim-
ply characterized by the relative size of the active population. With Lemma
3, observe that the aggregate wealth increases with the life-span ω: this in-
deed increases the length of retirement and consequently creates an extra
incentive for individual saving. Remark that the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution has no inﬂuence on the steady-state because we consider the
particular case of a stationary population; this is no longer true when the
retirement age is endogenous. Thus, the following proposition provides some
comparative statics for the yeoman farmer economy:
Proposition 1 When the retirement age is endogenous,
(i) an increase of longevity increases the age of retirement and the aggregate
wealth. Moreover, there exists ¯ ω>1 such that z ≥ 1 ⇔ ω ≥ ¯ ω.
(ii) an increase of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution reduces the age
of retirement and has an ambiguous eﬀect on the aggregate wealth. Moreover,
if ω<2, there exists ¯ σ>0 such that z ≥ 1 ⇔ σ ≤ ¯ σ;i fω ≥ 2, z>1.
Proof: Use, for α =1 , Eq. (9) as an implicit equation. For part (i) observe
9that dz/dω ∈ (0,1) and that dA/dω > 0 and ﬁnally, observe that ¯ ω can be
computed explicitly by replacing z =1i nt h ei m p l i c i te q u a t i o n .F o rp a r t( i i )
observe that because ω − z<1 is always true, one has dz/dσ < 0. Hence,
the sign of dA/dσ i st h eo p p o s i t eo ft h eo n eo fdA/dz if and only if z>ω / 2.
Finally, with the implicit equation, observe that z → ω when σ → 0 and,
replacing z =1compute ¯ σ to conclude that ¯ σ is positive only if ω<2. ¤
The intuition for Proposition 1 is the following: because of the consump-
tion/leisure arbitrage, an increase in longevity both increases the age of re-
tirement and the length of retirement; hence, dz/dω ∈ (0,1).T h em a g n i t u d e
of the latter derivative crucially depends on the parameter η that character-
izes the curvature of the utility function with respect to leisure. A lower η
means a utility more concave and consequently a higher dz/dω. At the limit
such that η → 0, one obtains a retirement age that goes to its lower bound:
ω − 1, and consequently dz/dω → 1. Equivalently, the eﬀect of longevity on
aggregate wealth is, at a ﬁrst glance, ambiguous since it both increases the
a v e r a g ea g eo ft h ec o n s u m e ra n dt h ea v e r a g ea g eo ft h ew o r k e r . H o w e v e r ,
since dz/dω ∈ (0,1),t h eﬁnal eﬀe c ti sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e .R e m a r kt h a tC h a n g
(1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2004) have pointed out the importance
of the assumption of certainty on individual life-span. In case of uncertain
life-span, an increase in longevity may reduce the age of retirement.
The eﬀect of an increase of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
on retirement is negative. Indeed, at the monetary steady-state such that
the interest rate is equal to zero, the elasticity does not inﬂuence the individ-
ual consumption growth rate. It then only modiﬁes the arbitrage between
consumption and leisure in favor of the second, which ultimately means less
10human wealth and consequently less consumption. The eﬀect of the elasticity
on aggregate wealth is then the opposite of the one, described above, of the
retirement age on wealth.
4M o n e t a r y c y c l e s
In this section, the linearized dynamics in the neighborhood of the mone-
tary steady-state given by Lemma 3 is studied. We successively analyze the
exogenous and endogenous retirement cases and look for particular long-run
ﬂuctuations deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 A monetary cycle is a periodic solution of the inter-temporal
equilibrium in the vicinity of the monetary steady-state.
4.1 Exogenous retirement
Assume that the retirement age is mandatory; replacing (2) in (7) yield
the size of the active population: P (t)=1for all t. The inter-temporal












The dynamics of R(t) is indeed dependent on the entire set of realizations
of R on the interval [t − ω,t+ ω]. Past realizations, that yield delays in
the dynamics, are generated by the vintage structure of human capital as
in Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2002), while future realizations
that yield advances in the dynamics, come from the assumption of perfect
foresight. Remark that Eq. (10) is non linear for any σ 6=1 , meaning that
revenue and substitution eﬀects do not compensate each others.
11Following Rustichini (1989), the proof of the existence of periodic solu-
tions uses the Hopf bifurcation theorem. We consider the local dynamics
around R =1 :i ti st h eo n eo fx(t) deﬁn e ds u c ht h a tR(t)=1+εx(t).




















Proof:R e p l a c e R(t)=1+εx(t) in Eq. (10) and do a Taylor expansion
in the neighborhood of ε =0 . Finally, H (λ) is obtained by the following
change of variable: x(t)=eλt and some algebra. ¤
It can be shown that the characteristic function H (λ) has an inﬁnity
of complex roots with negative real parts and an inﬁnity of complex roots
with positive real parts. This implies that the linearized dynamics is initially
characterized by oscillations that eventually disappear. These ﬂuctuations
are consequently of few interest because it is the dynamics in the neighbor-
hood of the steady-state which is studied. The following lemma hence focuses
on permanent ﬂuctuations yielded by the pure imaginary roots of H (λ).
Lemma 4 There exist (ω,σ) such that H (λ) has pure imaginary roots which
are Hopf bifurcation values.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps: 1) it supposes λ = iq and proves
there exists a least one q>0 such that H(iq)=0 ;i th e n c ed e ﬁnes (ω0,σ 0 (ω0))
the pair of parameters for which such a root exists. 2)I tu s e sσ as a bifurca-
tion parameter and shows that there exists a neighborhood of σ0 such that
dRe(H (λ))/dσ is not equal to zero while dIm(H (λ))/dσ =0 .
121)R e p l a c eλ = iq in Eq. (11) to obtain H (iq)=R e( H (iq)) + iIm(H (iq))
with:
Re(H (iq)) = −
µ











Im(H (iq)) = −
µ




The ﬁrst step of the proof proceed as follows: (i) it shows there exist, for
any σ,s o m e(ω0,q(ω0)) such that Im(H (iq(ω0))) = 0. (ii) it shows that
Re(H (iq(ω0))) = 0 is compatible with some σ>0.
(i) Observe that Eq. (13) rewrites:
















Roots of Im(H (iq)) are then q =2 kπ, q =2 kπ/ω and q =2 kπ/(ω − 1) for
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Consider now the roots q =2 kπ/(ω − 1) for k ∈ Z, replace them in Eq. (15)








With ω>1, conclude that the RHS of Eq. (16) is positive. Then for any
(ω,2kπ/(ω − 1)),k∈ Z, Im(H (iq)) = 0 is satisﬁed and there exists a σ>0
such that Re(H (iq)) = 0.N o t i c et h a tRe(H (iq)) 6=0for q =2 kπ.














13Then, compute Eq. (17) for p =0and observe it is not zero because q 6=
2kπ/ω. ¤
The following lemma gives an indication on the space of parameters that
yield a cycle.
Lemma 5 There exists a monetary cycle of period q only if σ<q / ω .
Proof:I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ep r o v et h el e m m af o rω<2, which is the realistic
case for a retirement age which equals 1. The proof for ω ≥ 2 is similar and
available upon request. We aim at showing that σ−q/ω < 0 when σ is deﬁned












Now, it is suﬃcient to show that φ(k,ω) < 0. Because ∂φ(k,ω)/∂k < 0,w e
have to prove that φ(1,ω) < 0. Then, just observe that ∂φ(1,ω)/∂ω > 0
for ω>1 and that φ(1,2) ' −3. ¤
Suﬃciently strong revenue eﬀects are then necessary to obtain monetary
cycles. The magnitude of these eﬀect depends on the periodicity of the price
cycle or, equivalently, of the inﬂation rate cycle, relative to the individual
life-span: to obtain a cycle with a lower periodicity, a stronger revenue eﬀect
is needed. Remark, nevertheless, that we obtain this result with a discount
rate equal to zero while it is quite established in the literature that cycles
are more likely to occur when individuals heavily discount the future.
4.2 Endogenous retirement
Assume now that the retirement age is endogenous. To deﬁne the inter-
temporal equilibrium, it is necessary to characterize the size of the active
14population and consequently to know how cohorts leave the labor market. It
is then useful to deﬁne the “last in, last out” property.
Deﬁnition 4 For all t ≥ 0,l e ts0 be the greatest s ∈ [t − ω,t] such that
s0 + z (s0)=t. Then, cohorts satisfy the “last in, last out” property if and
only if for all s<s 0, s + z (s) ≥ t.
According to deﬁnition 4, when there is “last in, last out”, cohorts leave
the labor market in the same order they have entered it; consequently,
P (t)=z (t − P (t)). Otherwise, it may exist some date t0 such that there is
no cohort that leave the labor market and some date t1 such that diﬀerent
c o h o r t sl e a v ei ts i m u l t a n e o u s l y .I fs u c hs i t u a t i o n sw e r et oo c c u r ,t h ea n a l y t -
ical characterization of the inter-temporal equilibrium would be drastically
complicated. However, the following lemma eliminates such situations in the
neighborhood of the steady-state.
Lemma 6 In the neighborhood of the monetary steady-state, the “last in,
last out” property holds.
Proof: Observe ﬁrst that optimal age of retirement, deﬁned as the z (.) that
solve Eq. (5), is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to s. Indeed, as
R(.) ∈ C1 (R+),t h e nz (s) is C1 (R+). Consequently, there is “last in, last
out” if and only if 1+dz (s)/ds > 0. In the neighborhood of the monetary
steady-state this condition is satisﬁed because dz (s)/ds =0 . ¤
It is now possible to characterize the inter-temporal equilibrium in the
neighborhood of the monetary steady-state. It is the solution of the following








t−ω (R(s + z (s)))




t R(v)dv =( R(t + z (t)))





P (t)=z (t − P (t)).
(19)
The ﬁrst equation of system (19) is the equilibrium condition in the good
market which has been modiﬁed by replacing the optimal condition on in-
dividual retirement (the second equation). Remark that the dynamics of
R is governed by distributed delays and advances while the dynamics of z
depends on the future realizations of R only. Finally, the third equation
characterizes the size of the population when there is “last in, last out”. The
main diﬀerence between system (19) and Eq. (10) relies on the presence of
state-dependent delays and advances.
Consider the local dynamics around the steady-state deﬁned by Eq. (9).





z (t)=z + εy(t),









η =0 . Remark that state-dependent delays
and advances vanish in the linearized system and that it is consequently
possible to apply Rustichini (1989).





































16Proof: Replace system (20) in system (19) and do a Taylor expansion in
the neighborhood of ε =0 . This yields h(t)=y(t − z) and a system of
two equations. Write the Jacobian matrix J and then Q(λ)=d e tJ.S o m e
algebra yield Eq. (21). ¤
As in the previous case, only pure imaginary roots are now considered.
Lemma 7 Q(λ) has no pure imaginary roots.
Proof: The proof shows that |Q(iq)| > 0. Using Eq. (21), one has:
|Q(iq)| =
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+( 1+ε)+|1 − σ|
¶
. (23)
with ε>0.S h o w i n gt h a tφ(σ) < 0 for all σ>0 is then suﬃcient to conclude.
One indeed has: φ
0 (σ) > 0 while φ(1) < 0 and limσ→+∞φ(σ) < 0. ¤
The main result of this section is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When the retirement age is optimally chosen by the individ-
uals, the occurrence of monetary cycles is ruled out.
Proof: Given lemmas 4 and 7, the proof is immediate. ¤
Let us now turn to the general comment of this section’s results. In
the exogenous retirement case, we have shown that increasing the frequency
17of trade within generations, is not suﬃcient to smooth the strong revenue
eﬀects that may yield cycles in OLG models. Conversely, introducing a simple
leisure choice modelled as a retirement decision has been proved to be crucial
for the occurrence of monetary cycles. The intuition is the following: for
mandatory retirement age, an anticipation of high prices, which corresponds
to low interest rate, increases the individual savings when the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution is small. This increases the aggregate wealth and
increases the prices. But if individuals are allowed to choose their retirement
age, an anticipation of high prices is an incitation to retire later because high
prices implies high nominal wages. This consequently lower the incitation
to save and the ﬁnal eﬀect on aggregate wealth is then lower than in the
mandatory retirement case.
Proposition 2 should extend to more general economies. First, allowing
for endogenous entree in the labor market, with a schooling decision as in
de la Croix and Licandro (1999), would produce the same result: cycles
would be more likely with a mandatory age for the end of education than
with an optimally chosen one. In production economies, some non linearities
are added, and then endogenous cycles are possible even with endogenous
labour supply. This was notably shown by Whitesell (1986) and Matsuyama
(2005). However, Cazzavillan and Pintus (2004) and Nourry and Venditti
(2006) prove, in a two-period framework, that the occurrence of cycles is
reduced if individuals are supposed to consume during their youth.
185C o n c l u s i o n
In this article, we analyze the existence of long-run ﬂuctuations in OLG
economies. We show that when individuals choose their retirement age,
some periodic solutions of the inter-temporal equilibrium dynamics vanish. It
should be now interesting to study the existence and uniqueness of the inter-
temporal equilibrium. For linear MFDE, the existence problem was studied
by d’Albis and Augeraud-Véron (2004) while the indeterminacy issue was
analyzed by Demichelis and Polemarchakis (2007). However, the problem is
increased with state-dependent delays because of the characterization of the
initial conditions.
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